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Non-conviction DNA
databases in the United
States and England:
historical differences,
current convergences?
By Liz Campbell*
University of Aberdeen
Abstract Collecting DNA from crime scenes and individuals and storing it in
databases is regarded increasingly as critical for criminal investigation and
prosecution. This article considers the development of non-conviction DNA
databases in the United States and England and Wales, and examines why
current legal trajectories are in opposite directions, with the United States
becoming more permissive in terms of database expansion and England and
Wales less so. It posits that any such trend is contingent on many factors.
Political and cultural variables in England and Wales prompted database
expansion, facilitated by the absence of robust constitutional protection for
privacy. Nevertheless, the jurisprudence of the European Convention on Human
Rights now limits this scheme. In contrast, classical liberal ideology and the
construal of the norm of privacy provided a brake in the American context, yet it
appears that non-conviction databases will become more common there given
extant interpretation of the US Constitution.
Keywords DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) retention; Non-conviction databasesDhe collection of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) from crime scenes and from
individuals is regarded increasingly in political, policing and popular
discourse as a critical aspect of effective modern criminal investigation
and prosecution. The benefits of gathering and comparing DNA are manifold:
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NON-CONVICTION DNA DATABASES IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND
suspects may be more readily and speedily identified, innocent persons may be
ruled out and the wrongfully convicted exonerated, while the enhanced
likelihood of detection may deter some would-be criminal actors. Beyond this, the
rationale for creating repositories in which to hold such DNA on an ongoing basis
is that it allows for later automated speculative (or 'cold') searching, thereby facili-
tating comparisons between stored samples and material collected subsequently
from crime scenes or victims rather than requiring renewed or repeat individual
collection. Despite the consensus regarding DNA's significance for criminal
justice, policies governing collection and retention of genetic material differ
greatly between jurisdictions. In particular, the issue is most fraught and divisive
concerning arrestees, or 'non-convicted' persons more generally, given that DNA
collection from an individual before a criminal trial affects the rights to bodily
integrity,' to personal privacy2 and the privilege against self-incrimination,' while
ongoing storage of DNA arguably impacts on the right to privacy and the
presumption of innocence.'
Rather than exploring these affected rights, or reiterating the science of DNA, the
technology of DNA profiling, its significance in criminal investigations, its
1 Extant case law in the United States and Europe indicates that DNA collection does not unjusti-
fiably affect the right to bodily integrity. In United States v Kincade 379 F3d 813 (9th Cir 2004) (en
banc) the intrusion of a blood test for the purposes of DNA collection was described as 'not signif-
icant' and in United States vPool 645 F Supp 2d 903 (2009) the intrusion was seen as 'minimal'. The
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) emphasised in Julnke v Turkey, 13 May 2008, App. No.
52515/99 at para. 72 that Arts 3 and 8 do not 'prohibit recourse to a medical procedure in defiance
of the will of a suspect in order to obtain from him or her evidence of his or her involvement in the
commission of a criminal offence', but this must be warranted on the facts of a particular case and
must not constitute inhuman and degrading treatment. Similarly, although compulsory urine
tests to detect drug consumption in prisoners interfered with Art. 8, they were deemed 'necessary
in a democratic society ... for the prevention of disorder or crime' (Peters v Netherlands, Commission
Application No. 21132/93, 6 April 1994).
2 In the absence of a Supreme Court on point, US state courts have supported the forcible collection
of DNA from arrestees despite Fourth Amendment challenges: see, e.g.,Anderson v Virginia 650 SE2d
702 at 706 (Vir 2006); United States v Pool 645 F Supp 2d 903 (2009); Haskell and Ento v Brown 677 F Supp
2d 1187 (2009).The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in S and Marperv United
Kingdom (2009) 48 EHRR 50 found that the taking of DNA pursued the legitimate aim of 'linking a
particular person to the particular crime of which he or she is suspected' (at para. 100) and while it
recognised the importance of such information in the detection of crime it 'delimit[ed] the scope
of its examination' to the retention of such persons' DNA (at para. 106). Despite the finding of
breach of the right to privacy under Art. 8 in this specific case, the judgment may be read as
approving collection and retention of DNA in limited circumstances notwithstanding the
implications for privacy.
3 The dicta in Sauinders v United Kingdom (1997) 23 EHRR 313 at para. 69 and Schmerber v California 384
US 757 at 761 (1966)discount decisively physical evidence and therefore DNAfroi the scope of the
privilege against self-incrimination.
4 See S and Marper v United Kingdom (2009) 48 EHRR 50; United States v Pool 645 F Supp 2d 903 at 915
(2009); United States v Mitchell 681 F Supp 2d 597 (2009).
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probative value or associated evidential problems (which have been assessed ably
elsewhere), this article will consider, through policy analysis, the development of
non-conviction6 databases in the United States and England and Wales, and will
examine why the current legal trajectories are in opposite directions. The policies
and practices in England and Wales were the most permissive in the common law
world as to the populations from whom DNA samples may be taken and retained;
for the past decade samples have been taken from arrested and charged persons
and retained indefinitely but this is currently being amended to accord with
ECtHR case law. In a contrasting trend, the United States, at the federal level, and
many American states have been more circumspect in extending DNA collection
and retention to non-convicted persons, but significant momentum is gathering
towards DNA collection from certain arrestees.
Crime control measures in the US often represent a prototype for other countries,
in terms of the trend and direction of policy transfer.' However, rather than the
'American exceptionalism' so often cited in criminological literature,' England
and Wales once represented somewhat of an anomaly in regard to surveillance,'
with the most expansive scheme of DNA retention for innocent persons in the
common law world, though this is to change. Comparing these jurisdictions is
instructive due to their shared cultural and common law heritage, and the degree
of criminal justice policy transfer between them in a general sense. This article
will explore numerous ideological, political and pragmatic reasons which may
have hitherto safeguarded non-convicted persons in the United States from DNA
sampling and categorisation. Then it will examine the extent to which the law has
a determinative function insofar as it may curb or alternatively facilitate policy
drivers relating to DNA databases, given that human rights cases now force the
reining in of the English approach while the interpretation of the Constitution
5 F. R. Bieber, 'Science and Technology ofForensic DNA Profiling: Current Use and Future Directions'
in D. Lazer (ed.), The Technology ofjustice :DNA and the CriminalJustice System (MIT Press: Massachusetts,
2004) ch. 3; M. Redmayne, 'Doubts and Burdens: DNA Evidence, Probability and the Courts' [1995]
Crim LR 464.
6 The term'non-conviction' is used as shorthand throughout this article in relation to the process of
DNA collection and retention which is not dependent on a criminal conviction and occurs
regardless of the results of investigation or prosecution. One viable alternative term,
'pre-conviction', may suggest that a conviction does indeed follow, which is not necessarily the
case, while 'arrestee' is not appropriate given that the process may apply to persons prior to arrest
in England and Wales.
7 T. Jones and T. Newburn, 'Learning from Uncle Sam? Understanding US Influences over UK Crime
Control Policy' (2002) 15(1) Governance 97; T. Newburn, 'Atlantic Crossings: "Policy Transfer" and
Crime Control in the USA and Britain' (2002) 4 Punishment & Society 165.
8 See, e.g., T. Jones and T. Newburn, Policy Transfer aind Criminal Justice: Exploring US Influence over British
Crime Control Policy (Open University Press: Maidenhead, 2007) 5.
9 Franko Aas, 'Surveillance: Citizens and the State' (2009) 6(3) Surveillance & Society 317 at 318.
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permits expansion in the United States. In other words, political imperatives or
penological trends are circumscribed by the structure and implementation of the
basic law of the state.
DNA and criminal justice
Before considering the powers that exist on both sides of the Atlantic as regards
DNA collection and retention, it is useful to discuss briefly the significance of DNA
and how it operates in the context of criminal justice. The genetic material in
human DNA determines physical characteristics and traits, genetic disorders,
susceptibility to disease and ethnic origin. Crucially for the purposes of criminal
investigation, an individual's DNA is unique (except in the case of identical twins)
and is inherited from both one's parents. As more similarities may be seen in the
DNA of siblings and family members when compared with unrelated persons,
DNA may reveal familial relationships. Thus, a DNA sample contains a range of
intimate personal and family information. In contrast, a DNA profile, generated
from a sample, is a set of identifying characteristics from regions of DNA that are
not known to provide for any physical characteristics or medical conditions of the
person. A profile, which includes a gender indicator, consists of a list of numbers
based on specific areas of DNA known as short tandem repeats and thus may only
be read and interpreted with the aid of technology."' Although profiles are
computerised, they still contain 'substantial amounts of unique personal data''
including information about familial relationships and ethnic origin. Using DNA
in criminal investigations involves the comparison of material gathered from
crime scenes and samples and/or profiles collected from individuals in the hope of
a match which would permit narrowing the investigation to one or more
particular persons.
Many fallacies exist about DNA evidence insofar as it is often viewed as completely
reliable and beyond question. However, as with other forms of physical evidence,
the potential for false positives exists. The profiling system in the UK collects
markers from 10 regions or loci of an individual's DNA, whereas the previous
system used six and in the United States 13 loci are used. Therefore it is entirely
possible that an 'adventitious match' could occur between two DNA profiles:
indeed, the current British methodology has been criticised by Alec Jeffreys, the
10 Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, Postnote, The National DNA Database, February
2006, No. 258, available at <http:/!www.parliament.ukjdocumentsipost/postpn258.pdf>, accessed 5
August 2011.
11 S and Marper v United Kingdom (2009) 48 EHRR 50 at paras 73-76.
12 FBI, 'Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) on the CODIS Program and the National DNA Index
System', available at <http:/!www.fbi.gov/about-us/labicodisicodis-and-ndis-fact-sheet>, accessed 5
August 2011.
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scientist responsible for developing the method of profiling," who has called for
an increase of the number of markers collected to 15 or 16.14 While the danger of
false matches is recognised in British official documents, it is argued that further
testing of additional DNA loci would enable a distinction to be drawn between two
such individuals' DNA, except in the case of identical twins." In addition, false
matches could also occur as a result of contamination at the time the swab was
taken, or during comparison in the laboratory. Furthermore, human error in
storage, processing or interpretation is always possible, as with all other physical
evidence. It is also conceivable that a positive match could be found between
crime scene material and a suspect's DNA which does not denote criminal culpa-
bility, by virtue of a person innocently being present at a particular location, or
through the 'planting' of evidence, or by the creation of 'false' or mixed DNA.16
Moreover, despite popular media portrayal, logistical, practical or financial
reasons mean that not all crime scenes are swabbed for genetic material, and so
comparison with database profiles is not always part of an investigation. Finally,
notwithstanding the political hyperbole and lure of scientific evidence, the
number of detections and convictions resulting from the matching of crime scene
DNA to a personal profile already on the database may be very low, with one
estimate as little as 0.3 per cent."
The law on DNA collection and retention
The history of and current laws on DNA databases will now be outlined to demon-
strate the contrasting trajectories of policy in England and Wales and the United
States. The UK's National DNA Database (NDNAD) was set up in 1995 and contains
genetic material gathered from all over the United Kingdom (Scotland also has its
own discrete database)." A number of categories of genetic material are kept on
13 See <http://vww2.1e.ac.uk/departments/emfpu/genetics/explained/profiling-history>, accessed 5
August 2011.
14 House of Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology, Seventh Report, Session 2004-05,
para. 86.
15 National DNA Database Strategy Board, National DINA Database Annual Report 2007-09, 42.
16 See <http://www.aolnews.comistory/aclu-challenges-calfornias-dna-law/713971>, accessed 11 February 2011.
17 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, The National DINA Database: Eighth Report of Session
2009-10, Volume I Report (Stationery Office: London, 2010) para. 6.
18 The provisions in Northern Ireland governing DNA retention are identical to those in England and
Wales (Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (SI 1989 No. 1341 (NI 12)), as
amended by the CriminalJustice and Police Act 2001). Scotland has its own criminal justice system
and a separate and distinct set oflaws on this issue. Profiles derived from DNA samples gathered in
Scotland are exported to the UK-wide National DNA Database, and thus may be checked against
those collected from persons in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. This arrangement is not
reciprocated. See P. Johnson and R. Williams, 'DNA and Criminal Investigation: Scotland and the
"UK National DNA Database"' (2004) Scottish Journal of Criniinal Justice Studies 10; L. Campbell, 'DNA
Databases and Innocent Persons: Lessons from Scotland?' (2010) 4Juridical Review 285.
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the NDNAD, namely biological material collected from crime scenes that relates to
an investigation, personal materials taken from a particular named individual
identified by the police, and volunteer samples. Profiles are uploaded onto the
database under one of these classifications as either crime scene or 'subject'
profiles. Proportionately speaking the NDNAD is the largest database of its kind in
the world and contained 7.39 per cent of the UK population in 2009," while most
recent figures indicate almost 9 per cent coverage.
The NDNAD was established following the implementation in England and Wales
of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, Part IV of which permitted the
taking and retention of samples from individuals convicted of a recordable
offence and the comparison of such samples with stored material. The Police and
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) had allowed bodily samples to be taken when a
person was charged, but samples obtained for DNA analysis were regarded as
intimate samples which required consent and collection by a health care profes-
sional. ' Developments in technology permitted DNA to be extracted from a buccal
(mouth) swab, and to this end s. 58 of the 1994 Act facilitated such collection by
reclassifying a mouth swab as a non-intimate sample which does not require
consent and could be collected by a police officer. While the NDNAD was not put
on a statutory footing in the 1994 Act, a policy document from the Home Office
outlined details regarding its formation and operation, such as it being an intelli-
gence database only,22 and the latitude granted to police forces regarding the
offences which entail DNA collection.
Rather than any single piece of consolidating legislation, the following years saw a
continuous and incremental expansion in England and Wales of police powers to
take and retain DNA samples. The Criminal Evidence (Amendment) Act 1997
allowed non-intimate samples to be collected from imprisoned individuals
convicted for certain sexual or violent offences even if convicted before the imple-
mentation of the 1994 Act, and from persons acquitted by reason of insanity but
19 House ofLords Constitution Committee, Surveillance: Citizens and the State, vol. I (HL Paper 18-1) (2009)
para. 180.
20 See National Policing Improvement Agency, Statistics, available at <http://www.npia.police.ukj
en/13338.htm>, accessed 5 August 2011.
21 Section 65. An'intimate sample' meant a sample of blood, semen or any other tissue fluid, urine,
saliva or pubic hair, or a swab taken from a person's body orifice, while a 'non-intimate sample'
was a sample of hair other than pubic hair, a sample taken from or from under a nail, a swab taken
from any part of a person's body other than a body orifice, or a footprint or a similar impression of
any part of a person's body other than a part of his hand.
22 Home Office, National DNA Database, Circular 16/95, para. 23.
23 Ibid. at para. 40.
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF EVIDENCE & PROOF286
NON-CONVICTION DNA DATABASES IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND
detained under the Mental Health Act .4 However, the 1994 Act did not permit
retention of DNA samples and the profiles obtained if the individual was acquitted
or not prosecuted subsequently. To remedy this perceived lacuna, indefinite
retention of DNA was introduced by the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001,25
prompted by controversy stemming from the decision in R v Weiras to the inadmis-
sibility of DNA evidence which should have been destroyed but was illegally
retained. The Court of Appeal refused to admit such DNA evidence and quashed
the resultant conviction for murder, 6 although the House of Lords later held that
the issue of admissibility should have been a matter for the trial judge." As well as
introducing indefinite non-conviction DNA retention, the 2001 Act had retro-
spective effect in that it validated the status of samples improperly held on the
database. Moreover, the Act specified that retention is permitted only for the
purposes of prevention and detection of crime, the investigation of an offence or
the conduct of a prosecution.
The Criminal Justice Act 2003 expanded this legal scheme still further to permit
DNA sampling from any individual arrested for or informed that he will be
reported for a recordable offence29 whether or not detained in a police station or in
police custody," and to allow for retention regardless of whether he is charged or
prosecuted or not. Despite these far-reaching powers, there was no legislative
provision in England and Wales as to the process of removal of a profile from the
NDNAD which instead is governed by police guidance documents. A person whose
DNA record is held on the NDNAD could request the chief constable of the relevant
24 Mental Health Act 1983, ss. 1 and 2.
25 See PACE, s. 64(1A), inserted by the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, s. 82(2).
26 RvWeir[2000] All ER(D) 751. In 1997 Weir was charged with drug-related offences and a sample of
saliva had been taken from him to generate a DNAprofile. The charges were discontinued, but the
sample was not destroyed as should have occurred as soon as was practicable. The following year a
burglary occurred in which one of the victims died and another was seriously injured. The police
compared a blood stain found at the crime scene with profiles on the DNA database, and a match of
the blood and Weir's DNA profile was identified. He was arrested and two further blood samples
confirmed the match. Weir was convicted of murder, burglary and assault and sentenced to life
imprisonment. He appealed against conviction, arguing that the sample should have been
destroyed, and that any evidence resulting therefrom was inadmissible. The Court of Appeal
allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction, finding that the trial judge had no discretion to
allow either the first sample or further evidence.
27 R v Veir [2001] 2 All ER 216.
28 PACE, s. 64(1A).
29 A recordable offence is one which carries the possibility of a custodial sentence as well as other,
non-imprisonable offences in the Schedule to the National Police Records (Recordable Offences)
(Amendment) Regulations 2005 (SI 2005 No. 3106).
30 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s. 10.
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police force to delete the profile, and this was to be granted at his discretion in
exceptional circumstances, such as where a false allegation was made or where
the person was unlawfully or wrongly arrested or unlawfully cautioned.31
However, these policies were applied unevenly,32 and both the Home Affairs
Committee and the ECtHR noted that removal of DNA from the database occurred
rarely.33
In R v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police, ex p. LS and Marper, S (an acquitted child)
and Marper (an adult against whom proceedings were not initiated) sought
judicial review of the decision of the police to collect and retain their DNA, but
this was rejected by the Divisional Court on the basis that the decision did not
contravene either the individual's right to a private life under Article 8 or his right
not to be discriminated against under Article 14 of the ECHR. The Court ofAppeal
upheld this on the grounds that the risks to the individual were not great and were
outweighed by the benefits of retention." Similarly, the House of Lords dismissed
the appeal, finding that there was no breach of Article 8, but that if such a breach
had occurred it constituted minor interference only, and moreover that retention
was proportionate to its aims.31 S and Marper challenged this decision in the
ECtHR in Strasbourg" where the Grand Chamber held that this 'blanket and
indiscriminate' retention of DNA violated Article 838 and favoured limiting
non-conviction retention to serious suspected offences for a defined period of
time.39 A more restrictive model was constructed by the Crime and Security Act
2010, but this Act was not implemented due to the change of administration in
the United Kingdom.
The current ConservativelLiberal Democrat coalition is moving to a more limited
approach by means of the Protection of Freedoms Bill, which is currently being
debated. The Bill as it stands at the time of writing permits non-conviction DNA
31 Association of Chief Police Officers' Guidance on the Exceptional Case Procedure, available
at <http://www.acpo.police.ukiaspipolicies/Data/guidance%20for%2Oremoval%20from%20database.
doc>, accessed 5 August 2011.
32 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, above n. 17 at para. 16.
33 Ibid. at para. 38; S and Marper v United Kingdom (2009) 48 EHRR 50 at para. 35.
34 R v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police, ex p. LS and Marper [2002] EWHC 478 (Admin).
35 R v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police, ex p. LS and Marper [2002] EWCA Civ 1275.
36 R v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police, ex p. LS and Marper [2004] UKHL 39.
37 An individual application may be lodged in the ECtHR by any person, group of individuals,
company or NGO who has exhausted domestic remedies and has a complaint about a violation of
their right against a country which has ratified the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR).
38 S and Marper v United Kingdon (2009) 48 EHRR 50 at para. 119.
39 Ibid. at paras 109-110.
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retention for three years in the case of arrest for certain serious offences.4 This
may be extended for two years on application to the magistrates' court, and appeal
against this decision is permitted to the Crown Court.1 Although material maybe
retained pending investigation or proceedings, it must be deleted after acquittal
or dropping of proceedings for minor offences.
In the United States, inclusion in state DNA index systems (SDIS) and the National
DNA Index System (NDIS) is governed by state and federal law respectively which
often differ considerably in terms of permissible DNA collection and retention.
Virginia was the first state in the USA to establish a DNA database, by requiring all
convicted sex offenders to provide a DNA sample from 1989 and extending this to
all convicted felons in 1990.3 At federal level, the Combined DNA Index System
(CODIS) and the NDIS were established in 1998.44 This national database contains
DNA profiles contributed by federal, state and local laboratories and is subdivided
into a Forensic Index, containing profiles deriving from crime scene samples, and
an Offender and Arrestee Index.4 All 50 states and the District of Columbia partic-
ipate in NDIS, 6 and essentially, CODIS allows federal, state and local crime
laboratories to exchange and compare DNA profiles.47 By the turn of this century
all states had legislated for DNA databases, although differences exist in terms of
the included populations.
In contrast to England and Wales, DNA has been collected from a more circum-
scribed range of people in the US at federal level. The DNA Analysis Backlog
Elimination Act of 200048 authorised DNA sampling from individuals in the
custody of the Bureau of Prisons who were convicted of serious offences, such as
homicide, sexual abuse or exploitation, kidnapping, robbery and burglary; this
was extended by the USA Patriot Act of 2001 to include terrorism-related crimes'9
and by the Justice for All Act of 2004 to cover all felonies, violent and sexual
crimes." Arrestee samples could not be uploaded to the federal database until the
DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005 required DNA sample collection by US agencies 'from
40 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, ss. 18-20 (as amended).
41 Protection of Freedoms Bill, cl. 63F(7).
42 Protection of Freedoms Bill, cl. 63E.
43 Code ofVirginia § 19.2-310.2.
44 FBI, above n. 12.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 See National Institute of Justice, NIJ Special Report: Using DINA to Solve Cold Cases (US Department of
Justice: Washington DC, 2002).
48 Public Law 106-546, 114 Stat. 2726-2737.
49 Public Law 107-56, 115 Stat. 272-402 (2001), Title V.
50 Public Law 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260-2293 (2004), Title II, the 'Debbie Smith Act of 2004'.
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individuals who are arrested or from non-U.S. persons who are detained under the
authority of the United States'." Expungement occurs on receipt of a court order
certifying that the charge has been dismissed or resulted in an acquittal, or that
no charges are being brought.
Almost half of states now have laws authorising arrestee DNA sampling, but these
pertain to felonies or offences punishable by a minimum period of imprisonment
only.53 Louisiana has one of the broadest schemes in the US, requiring the
collection of DNA samples for inclusion in the state database from persons who
are arrested for felony offences and other specified offences5 4 Whereas the United
States once appeared reluctant to introduce policies permitting non-conviction
DNA retention, such a trend is strengthening. This article considers a number of
reasons, ideological, political and pragmatic, in seeking to shed light on the
historical differences and current opposing trajectories of England and Wales and
the United States in terms of DNA retention." In an ideological sense, existing
laws on, judicial interpretations of and values concerning privacy, searches, and
state intervention informed the policies permitted and implemented in relation
to DNA collection and retention. Politically speaking, the degree of policy transfer
and the actions of policy entrepreneurs have contributed to the ready adoption
and expansion of DNA databases, and this is compounded by the prevalence of the
notion of risk in political discourse. Moreover, the advancement of DNA
technology and available funding are also critical in a pragmatic sense. However,
ultimately the interpretation and implementation of constitutional law and
human rights governs the scope of the schemes and explains why the trends differ
increasingly in both countries.
51 Title X of the Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005,
Public Law 109-162.
52 Section 2.
53 Alaska, Arizona, California, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico,
North and South Carolina, North and South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont and Virginia
have laws authorising arrestee DNA sampling. See the website of the National Conference of
State Legislatures, available at <http:/www.ncsLorg/IssuesResearch/CivilandCriminalJustice!
StateLawsonDNADataBanksjtabid1273 7/Default.aspx>, accessed 5 August 2011.
54 (SB 346) Act No. 487 of 2003; Chapter 6-A, § 15:609.
55 Similarly see T.Jones and T. Newburn, 'Comparative Criminal Justice Policy-making in the United
States and the United Kingdom: The Case of Private Prisons' (2005) 45(1) BritishJournal of Criminology
58; S. Karstedt, 'Durkheim, Tarde and Beyond: The Global Travel of Crime Policies' (2002) 2(2)
Criminology and Criminal Justice 111; D. Melossi, 'The Cultural Embeddedness of Social Control:
Reflections on the Comparison of Italian and North-American Cultures Concerning Punishment'
(2001) 5(4) Theoretical Criminology 403.
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Ideology and DNA databases
The dominant norms engaged by DNA collection and retention are that of
privacy5 and liberty, and the apparent reluctance to and delay in constructing
non-conviction DNA databases in the United States may derive from legally and
culturally entrenched ideologies, when contrasted with England and Wales."
The right of privacy
While no express right of privacy exists in the United States, a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy derives from the Fourth Amendment which generally requires
judicial authorisation for physical searches, and in addition a tort of privacy
exists. Furthermore, statutory protection of personal information collected,
retained and used by federal bodies is guaranteed by the Privacy Act 1974. In a
constitutional sense, the relevant jurisprudence developed from a dissent in
Olnstead v United States where, although the majority found wiretapping evidence
not to breach the Fourth and Fifth Amendments," Brandeis J construed the Fourth
Amendment broadly to encompass 'the right to be let alone'." The US Supreme
Court subsequently noted that 'the "right to be let alone-the most comprehensive
of rights and the right most valued by civilized men" is not confined literally to
searches and seizures as such, but extends as well to the orderly taking under
compulsion of process'.60 Although '[t]he concept of a constitutional right of
privacy still remains largely undefined'," the right to be left alone, deriving from
Cooley and emphasised by Warren and Brandeis," encapsulates the quint-
essentially American conception of protection of privacy, that is a liberty which
provides protection from government interference."
Conversely, it is conceivable that the historical absence of a justiciable right of
privacy in England and Wales led to a jurisprudence and a polity that disregarded
its importance, thus facilitating the expansion of the DNA database at one stage.
Despite the finding in cases such as Entick v Carrington that only with due
authorisation could a person's home be entered by agents of the state,64 less
56 4. Roberts and N. Taylor, 'Privacy and the DNA Database' (2005) European Human Rights Law Review
381.
57 D. Carling, 'Less Privacy Please, We're British: Investigating Crime with DNA in the U.K. and the
U.S.' (2008) 31 Hastings International and Conparative Law Review 487 at 502.
58 277 US 438 (1928).
59 277 US 438 at 478 (1928).
60 United States v Morton Salt Company 338 US 632 at 651-2 (1950).
61 Wh'alen v Roe 429 US 589 (1977).
62 S. Warren and L. Brandeis, 'The Right to Privacy' (1890) 4 Harv LR 193, citing Cooley on Torts, 2nd edn
(1888) 29. See D. Glancy, 'Invention of the Right to Privacy' (1979) 21(1) Arizona LR 1.
63 See Tehan v United States 382 US 406 at 416 (1966).
64 Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 State Trials 1030 (1B).
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judicial emphasis has been placed on the importance of privacy in England than in
the United States. As Lord Nicholls emphasised in Campbell v MGN Ltd, 'In this
country, unlike the United States of America, there is no over-arching, all-
embracing cause of action for "invasion of privacy"'."' While this may overstate the
situation in the United States, it echoes the sentiment of Lord Hoffmann in
Wainwright v Home Office:
What the courts have so far refused to do is to formulate a general
principle of 'invasion of privacy' (I use the quotation marks to signify
doubt about what in such a context the expression would mean) from
which the conditions of liability in the particular case can be
deduced."
Instead of a right to privacy, the wrongful use of private information in England
and Wales has been governed by the cause of action known as breach of confi-
dence.67 Moreover, the Data Protection Act 1998 delineates the permissible
processing of personal data, but significantly it does not instantiate a right of
privacy per se.
Of course, this traditional depiction of the British approach to privacy is
challenged by the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) which imported
the protections of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into
domestic law, including Article 8 which provides that 'everyone has the right to
respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence'. The Act
requires legislation to be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with
the Convention rights so far as it is possible to do so 6 and prohibits public author-
ities from acting in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right.69
Nevertheless, in contrast to the remedy for breach of a constitutional right in the
United States which is direct insofar as it results in the striking down of offending
provisions, the HRA does not permit a policy to be nullified by virtue of the
infringement of a right, such as that of privacy. Instead, if the court is satisfied
that the provision is incompatible with a Convention right, it may make a decla-
ration of incompatibility." In this dialogic approach," Parliament then has the
65 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22 at [11].
66 Wainwright v Hone Office [2003] UKHL 53 at [19], per Lord Hoffmann.
67 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22 at [13].
68 HRA, s. 3(1).
69 HRA, s. 6(1).
70 HRA, s. 4.
71 See T. Hickman, 'Constitutional Dialogue, Constitutional Theories and the Human Rights Act
1998' [2005] Public Law 206.
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ability to remedy the situation if it chooses to do so, or a government Minister may
make a remedial order to remove the incompatibility.72 In addition to this
construction of rights protection which provides less of a judicial bulwark against
legislative demands than in the United States, the framing of Article 8 provides a
less than robust guarantor of privacy as it permits state interference to the extent
that it is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of factors including the prevention of disorder or crime.
The traditional absence of a right of privacy may have contributed to a cultural
milieu in which policy makers felt that this norm could be abrogated without
popular disquiet. Moreover, despite the enactment of the HRA, some English
politicians and the superior courts did not internalise either the principle or the
right of privacy. Indeed, the extent to which the previous Labour administration
favoured an ideology of crime control and surveillance over privacy is exemplified
by the proposed national identity scheme and the expansion of CCTV coverage,
prompting the Information Commissioner to warn against the possibility of the
United Kingdom sleepwalking into what he referred to as a 'surveillance society'.73
While his sentiment is understandable, his choice of words underestimates the
political will behind such proposals, such as was evident in the Criminal Justice
and Police Act 2001 permitting indefinite DNA retention from non-convicted
persons. Moreover, one can perceive lingeringjudicial scepticism about the notion
and significance of privacy in the domestic English courts' decision in R v Chief
Constable of South Yorkshire Police, ex p. LS and Marper, as described above.74 The
domestic courts' resistance to the submissions of S and Marper encapsulates a
particular and agnostic perspective on the right of privacy.
On the face of it, contrasting conceptions of privacy may go some way towards
explaining the relative reluctance to expanding non-conviction DNA databases in
the United States. Whitman presents a useful differentiation between continental
European privacy protections which pertain to respect and personal dignity, in
72 HRA, s. 10(2). T. Campbell, 'Human Rights: A Culture of Controversy' (1999) 26Jouirnal of Law and
Society 6 at 25; C. Gearty, Can Human Rights Survive? (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2006)
69 et seq. The Joint Committee on Human Rights has recommended that the UK government must
clearly state that it is its policy to take steps to remedy any incompatibility as soon as possible after
a declaration has become final (joint Committee on Human Rights, Monitoring the Governments
Response to Court Judgments Finding Breaches of Human Rights, Sixteenth Report, 28 June 2007, HL
128/HC 728, para. 119).
73 House of Lords Constitution Committee, above n. 9 at para. 2, referring to R. Ford, 'Beware rise of
Big Brother state, warns data watchdog', The Times, 16 August 2004. The Information Commis-
sioner's Office is an independent public body which upholds information rights in the public
interest and promotes freedom of information by public bodies and data privacy.
74 See above, text accompanying n. 34.
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contrast to America which is more oriented toward values of liberty.' Thus, the
perception in the United States of privacy as freedom in a personal sense,76 or as
liberty in a political one, rather than privacy as dignity,7 may go some way
towards explaining the traditional reluctance to classify individuals and thereby
monitor them through DNA databases. In Colorado, for example, Senate Bill 241
to permit DNA collection from individuals arrested for felonies divided Repub-
lican senators," and in the US Congress, opposition to a proposal to collect DNA
from all arrestees was predicated on the notion of privacy.7 However, this
depiction of the United States as valorising the right of privacy may not be an
accurate modern portrayal, given that other federal and state developments in the
United States indicate no necessary aversion to abrogating this norm: the Patriot
Act has permitted extensive surveillance since the terrorist attacks in New York,"
biometric identification is becoming more commonplace, the use of CCTV is
growing, and comprehensive databases of personal information are kept by state
agencies such as the Department of Motor Vehicles. Moreover, a straightforward
privacy argument is confounded by the more limited approach to DNA collection
and retention in Scotland, which shares the same limited conception of privacy as
England and Wales and, as part of the UK, has the same structure of human rights
protection." This suggests that it may not be the legal right to privacy as such but
rather the cultural understanding of legitimate state action and intrusion that
affected the introduction and extension of DNA databases, and go some way
towards explaining the more positive reception to non-conviction databases in the
United States now.
The primacy of liberty
Both underpinning and extending beyond the specific right to privacy, the
one-time aversion towards DNA retention in the United States may be explained
by the dominance of classical liberal precepts over competing communitarian
75 J. Whitman, 'The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty' (2003-2004)113 Yale LJ
1151 at 1160.
76 See R. Post, 'Three Concepts of Privacy' (2000-2001) 89 Georgetown Law Journal 2087.
77 Whitman, above n. 75 at 1151.
78 See record ofvoting at <https://wwwvotesmart.org/issue-keyvote-member.php?cs-id=25263> and
'DNA collection bill divides Republicans', 28 April 2009, available at <http://facethestate.com/
articles/15759-dna-collection-bill-divides-republicans>, accessed 5 August 2011.
79 Congressional Record: 14 July 2008 H6440, per Ms Jackson-Lee of Texas.
80 See L. Donohue, 'Anglo-American Privacy and Surveillance' (2006) 96(3)Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology 1059.
81 In Scotland, a DNA sample may be retained only after prosecution when it does not lead to
conviction and only in relation to certain sexual or violent offences and is destroyed three years
following the conclusion of proceedings and a sheriff may extend this for no more than two years
(Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s. 18A, as amended by the Police, Public Order and
Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2006).
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demands. Crudely speaking, the dominant political principle in the United States
is that of individualistic or classical liberalism,2 embodied in negative liberty,
with an absence of external constraints on action and freedom from inter-
ference Such an interpretation of liberalism advocates a limited form of
government, and sees the public sphere as legitimate only to the extent that it
represents a delegation of a restricted and definite degree of private sovereignty.
This resonates, or at least it did until recently, with the extant political culture in
the United States to a greater extent than in England and Wales.
It is often felt that a tension inheres in the criminal justice system between due
process norms which favour the individual on the one hand, and, on the other, the
community's interest in the effective investigation of criminality. New Labour's
administration in the United Kingdom sought to 'rebalance' the justice system
towards the latter imperative," a trend which arguably seems less evident in the
United States due to the counterbalancing force of constitutional liberal due
process. While the precepts of liberalism underpin the British legal system in
terms of laws and culture, New Labour, in office until 2010, introduced various
criminal justice measures which embodied a certain regressive type of communi-
tarianism. Communitarianism is an epistemological, moral and political
ideology" which is differentiated from liberalism by its focus on the community
and the importance it places on civil society." The common thread running
through the different varieties of communitarianism centres on the obligations
owed to society and the need to tie responsibilities to rights.8 The individualistic
nature of liberal society is rejected, and a reconfiguration of laws and social
arrangements is recommended so as to recognise the centrality of the community.
Moreover, the community's rights may compete with individual rights," and this
ascription stems from a desire to protect it as an entity, in addition to its values
and members. This line of thought was adopted by New Labour in the United
Kingdom in introducing socially conservative and moralistic measures" such as
82 Classical liberalism is allied closely to the norms expounded during the Enlightenment and may
be differentiated from the more interventionist welfare liberalism of the 20th century.
83 J. S. Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays (J. Gray ed.) (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1991); I. Berlin, Two
Concepts of Liberty (Clarendon: Oxford, 1958); I. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (Cambridge
University Press: Cambridge, 1997) Part 1, Book 1, ch. 1.
84 Home Office, Rebalancing the Criminal Justice System in Favour ofthe Law-abiding Majority: Cutting Crime,
Reducing Reoffending and Protecting the Public (Home Office: London, 2006).
85 H. Tam, Comm unitarianism: ANlewAgendafor Politics and Citizenship (Macmillan: Basingstoke, 1998) 12.
86 M. Walzer, 'The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism' (1990) 18 Political Theory 6 at 7-9.
87 B. HudsonJustice in the Risk Society: Challenging and Re-affirmingJustice in Late Modernity (Sage: London,
2003) 94; A. Etzioni, The Spirit of the Contmmunity: Rights, Responsibilities and the Coinunitarian Agenda
(Fontana Press: London, 1993) 4 and 9.
88 Hudson, above n. 87 at 82-3.
89 G. Hughes, 'Communitarianism and Law and Order' (1996) 16 Critical Social Policy 17.
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anti-social behaviour orders and in limiting social welfare payments, predicated
on the need to tie rights to responsibilities."o As Driver and Martell argue, New
Labour's communitarianism was morally conformist, conservative rather than
progressive in terms of the family and education, prescriptive insofar as it was
defined by politicians and incorporated an individualistic leaning as it strength-
ened personal moral duties while neglecting corporate responsibility to the
community." Extending the DNA database shared these rationales, by its sub-
jugation of the individual's right of privacy and his interest in not being
stigmatised to the need to detect and resolve criminal cases.
Invoking the importance of the community in response to the fear of crime plays
on defensive reactions'2 and facilitates the introduction and implementation of
repressive elements which purport to protect that community. Moreover, such a
variant of communitarianism eases the 'othering' of the suspect, without any
finding of criminal guilt.9 This generates a parochial notion of the public
interest94 in which general governing principles such as liberty or equality may be
forgotten. While Etzioni argues that communitarians are not majoritarians and
do not advocate a utilitarian sacrifice of individual liberties for the greater good,95
the risk is that the internalisation of such ideas in the political sphere will lead to
this very consequence. Indeed the legislative expansion and financial support for
non-conviction DNA collection and retention in England and Wales embodied this
favouring of community interests over due process concerns in the political
sphere, and when combined with New Labour's emphasis on law and order
accounts for the bullish developments in England and Wales.
Political support for DNA databases
In addition to the impact of prevailing ideologies, specific policy entrepreneurs
are crucial to the growth of DNA databases, and their actions are often coter-
minous with a crisis of some sort. This is apparent in policy development in
England and Wales. Furthermore, when their presence coalesces with the
discourse of risk, the appeal of this crime control tactic is enhanced, as is
90 ASBOs were introduced by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. For an outline of the welfare changes
brought in by New Labour, see J. Hills, Thatcherism, New Labour and the Welfare State CASE/13 (Centre
for Analysis of Social Exclusion: London, 1998).
91 S. Driver and L. Martell, 'New Labour's Communitarianisms' (1997) 17 Critical Social Policv 27 at 35 et
seq.
92 Hudson, above n. 87 at 91.
93 D. Garland, The Culture of Control (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2001) 134 et seq.
94 A. Crawford, The Local Governance of Crime: Appeals to Community and Partnerships (Oxford University
Press: Oxford, 1999) 253.
95 Etzioni, above n. 87 at 255; A. Etzioni (ed.), The Essential Communitarian Reader (Rowman and
Littlefield: Maryland, 1998) xiv.
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increasingly evident in the United States. The intersection of political culture, the
politicisation of crime, and the cohesiveness of relevant institutions are seen by
Ismaili to provide the contextual features which determine the policies intro-
duced in criminal justice." In relation to non-conviction DNA databases, the
undeniable value of genetic material to criminal justice and the desire to adopt
scientific means to counter serious crime provide weighty imperatives for the
expansion of the populations of DNA databases, especially when an advocate
supports or pushes for legal amendment.
Policy enterprise
Incremental developments in the United States indicate a contrasting trajectory
of laws and policies when compared with England and Wales, in that the ECtHR
decision in S and Marper is forcing legal contraction in the latter. While it is
questionable whether these changes in the United States involve policy transfer as
such, which would require purposeful imitative activity, there is evidence
certainly of policy diffusion or convergence which involves societies becoming
more alike purely by the successive adoption of specific policy approaches. 7 US
state agencies and projects" and periodical police literature" on DNA databases
cite the 'UK [sic] experience' approvingly, while academic commentary in
American law reviews critically the English approach.' Nevertheless, an explo-
ration of US Senate and local debates indicates little evidence in political
discourse or legislative debate of conscious or explicit emulation of England.
96 K. Ismaili, 'Contextualizing the Criminal Justice Policy-making Process' (2006) 17 Criminal Justice
Policv Review 255 at 262 (Fig. 1).
97 Jones and Newburn, above n. 7 at 103; C. Bennett, 'What is Policy Convergence and What Causes
It? (1991) 21 British Journal of Political Science 215 at 220-1.
98 See the US National Institute of Justice DNA Initiative: <http://vww.dna.gov/solving-crimes/
property-crimesfuk-experience>; the Human Genome Project (HGP) coordinated by the US
Department of Energy and the National Institute of Health: <http://vww.ornl.gov/sci/
techresources/HumanGenome/elsi/forensics.shtml>, accessed 5 August 2011; W. M. Dale, 0.
Greenspan and D. Orokos, DNA Forensics: Expanding Uses and Information Sharing (National
Consortium for Justice Information and Statistics: California, 2006) 3; C. H. Asplen Smith, The
Application ofDNA Technology in England and Wales (Smith, Alling, Lane: Washington, 2004) available
at <http://www.ncjrs.govlpdffilesljnijjgrants/203971.pdf>, accessed 5 August 2011.
99 K. Wallentine, 'Collection of DNA upon Arrest: Expanding Investigative Frontiers', 1the Police
Chief, July 2011, available at <http://policechiefinagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=
display&issue-id=12010&categoryID=3>, accessed 5 August 2011.
100 See D. H. Kaye, 'Two Fallacies about DNAData Banks for Law Enforcement' (2001) 67 Brooklyn LR
179; M. A. Rothstein and S. Carnahan, 'Legal and Policy Issues in Expanding the Scope of Law
Enforcement DNA Data Banks' (2001) 67 Brooklyn LR 127; M. A. Rothstein and M. K. Talbott, 'The
Expanding Use of DNA in Law Enforcement: What Role for Privacy?' (2006) 34(2)Journal ofLaw and
Medical Ethics 153; M. Hibbert, 'DNA Databanks: Law Enforcement's Greatest Surveillance Tool'
(1999) 34(3) Wake Forest LR 767.
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Alteration to the extent of the population of DNA databases is influenced
considerably by political agents or 'entrepreneurs'."' The notion of a 'moral entre-
preneur' was first propounded by Becker, depicting a person who campaigns for
the creation and enforcement of a given rule to remedy a perceived wrong, evil, or
social problem.10 For Becker, such an enterprise entailed highlighting the rule
and its breach, followed by robust enforcement so as to both justify the role and
position of the entrepreneur and gain public approval. Becker was particularly
interested in how labelling an individual in this manner could serve to 'create'
deviancy and thereby contribute to the commission of criminality.103 Building on
Becker's work, other commentators have characterised agents in policy making as
public, social or norm entrepreneurs.104 Roberts and King describe 'public entre-
preneurship' as the process of introducing innovation into the public sector; this
may be through the introduction of a novel means of addressing criminality and
criminal investigation."o' They differentiate forms of public entrepreneurs by
means of a typology, comprising political entrepreneurs with elected leadership
positions in government; executive entrepreneurs who hold appointed leadership
positions in government; bureaucratic entrepreneurs holding formal although
not leadership positions in government; and policy entrepreneurs, who work
outside the formal governmental system."o' In addition, 'policy champions'
possess formal power and resource control and thus are central to the intro-
duction and implementation of a particular policy.107
Rather than moral entrepreneurs, a range of public entrepreneurs was instru-
mental in the expansion of DNA databases in England and Wales, and increasingly
account for policy expansion in the United States. When combined with victim
support and intersecting with a high-profile case,10 s the action of public entrepre-
101 D. Pozen, 'We Are All Entrepreneurs Now' (2008) 43 Wake Forest LR 283, 283.
102 H. Becker, Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance (Free Press: New York, 1963) 147-63.
103 The particular moral entrepreneur cited by Becker in his study of the labelling process was the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics which crusaded against the sale and use of marijuana. Commercial
dealings in cannabis, hemp and marijuana were taxed by the Marihuana Tax Act 1937. By
portraying users and the drugs in a particular way, and by emphasising the immorality of drug
taking and favouring personal responsibility, the Bureau was able to generate enough concern as
to expedite the introduction of robust legislation and to bolster its own influence and funding.
104 See Pozen, above n. 101.
105 N. Roberts and P. King, 'Policy Entrepreneurs: Their Activity Structure and Function in the Policy
Process' (1991) 1(2)Journal of Public Adininistration Research and Theory 147.
106 Ibid. at 152, referring to N. Roberts and P. King, 'Public Entrepreneurship: A Typology', paper
presented to the Academy of Management Meetings, Public Sector Division, 1989.
107 Ibid. referring to H. Angle and A. Van de Ven, 'Suggestions for Managing the Innovation Journey'
in A. Van deVen, H.Angle and M. Poole (eds), Research on the Management ofInnovation (Harper and
Row: New York, 1989) 663-97.
108 See, e.g., National DNA Database Strategy Board, above n. 15 at 8-9.
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neurs is critical. The NDNAD was established originally by means of the Criminal
Justice and Public Order Act 1994, introduced by Michael Howard, Home Secretary
of the Conservative Government. This Act (controversial in many other respects')
was followed by steady growth of the database, with cross-party support. Thus,
successive Home Secretaries and other Labour MPs who voted in favour of the
numerous Acts may be regarded as political entrepreneurs, while Labour Prime
Ministers Tony Blair and Gordon Brown were executive entrepreneurs with regard
to the NDNAD."o Likewise, in the American states which have introduced non-
conviction DNA databases, there is generally a public entrepreneur of some sort
endorsing such policy development. For example, Maryland recently amended its
DNA database system to permit DNA collection from certain arrestees and
uploading to the state database,' and this was pushed through vigorously by
Governor O'Malley with the support of the Democratic Party. "Governor O'Malley
sought to address the privacy concerns which arise in relation to non-conviction
databases113 by safeguards such as waiting until the first scheduled arraignment
date before DNA is analysed and automatic deletion of samples upon acquittal or
dismissal of charges. Similarly, the California Penal Code was amended by Propo-
sition 69 which requires DNA collection by buccal swab from any adult person
who is arrested for or charged with a felony offence,'14 and this was passed by
voters in November 2004 with the support of the Governor of California Arnold
Schwarzenegger and the California State Attorney-General." At the federal level,
the central policy entrepreneur in the US Senate regarding non-conviction DNA
databases is Jon Kyl, Senator for Arizona and Republican Whip. He introduced the
DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005 'to allow State and Federal law enforcement to catch
rapists, murderers, and other violent criminals whom it otherwise would be
impossible to identify and arrest'."' Furthermore, the most powerful policy
champion of them all, the American President Barack Obama, expressed his
support for DNA sampling upon arrest when interviewed by John Walsh of
The Act permits inferences to be drawn from silence (ss 34-39), and criminalised raves and
certain forms of protest.
110 Gordon Brown, 'Speech on Security and Liberty', Institute of Public Policy Research, 17 June
2008, available at <http:!/webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uki+/http://www.number1O.gov.ukj
Pagel5785>, accessed5 August 2011.
111 Chapter 337 (Senate Bill 211); Article: Public Safety; Title 2, Subtitle 5: Statewide DNA Data Base
System.
112 See <http://www.governor.maryland.govispeechesf090909.asp>, accessed 5 August 2011.
113 Ibid.
114 Penal Code, s. 296(a)(2)(C).
115 'ACLU Lawsuit Challenges California's Mandatory DNA Collection at Arrest', available at
<http://www.aclunc.orgjnews/press releases!aclu lawsuitchallenges-california%27s mandator
y dna-collection at arrest.shtml>, accessed 5 August 2011.
116 Senate Congressional Record, 29 July 2005, S9528; Senate Congressional Record, 16 December
2005, S13756, per Jon Kyl.
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America's Most Wanted, indicating that non-conviction DNA databases are likely to
grow in strength in the United States.
Policy entrepreneurs often rely on or are supported by victims, their families and
advocacy groups. In the 2010 general election, Labour pledged to refrain from
limiting the database to the greatest extent permissible under the ECHR and cited
the support of Linda Bowman whose daughter Sally Anne Bowman was murdered
in a crime solved using crucial DNA evidence.11 This embodies the trend noted by
commentators such as Garland whereby victims or their families become central
and representative characters, whose interests are often invoked to support
punitive measures."' Akin to co-opting of victim support by Labour, Proposition
69 was sponsored by Bruce Harrington whose brother and sister-in-law were
murdered,'1 while at the federal level, the DNA Fingerprint Act was endorsed by
the Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network. 1 The involvement ofvictims, families
and support groups in this way provides a weighty and persuasive endorsement
for non-conviction databases. Moreover, the presence of a crisis regarding DNA
evidence may provide a policy window 1 1 for the introduction of legislation
expanding the populations, such as occurred in relation to R v Weir.112 Indeed,
Johnson and Williams note that Scotland has never had an equivalent case where
conviction was based on illegally held DNA and posit that this, combined with lack
of resources, may explain the more limited scheme there rather than any
ideological matter.123 This notion of a policy window is particularly pronounced in
the United States, where non-conviction DNA collection laws are named after
victims. For example, in Arkansas Juli's Law (named after murder victim Juli
Busken) permits a law enforcement official at the receiving criminal detention
facility to take a DNA sample of a person arrested for capital or first degree
murder, kidnapping and sexual assault.124 Similarly, Katie's Law in New Mexico,
emulated at the federal level, 1 derives its name from murder victim Katie Sepich
whose parents 'crusad[e] tirelessly to help pass arrestee DNA laws nationwide'. 1
117 McCartney et al. note that in fact, the procedure under which Sally Anne Bowman's killer was
detected would not be affected by the decision in S and Marper. C. McCartney, R. Williams and T.
Wilson, The Future of Forensic Bioinformation (Nuffield Foundation: London, 2010) 1.22.
118 Garland, above n. 93 at 11-12 and 144.
119 See Anna Gorman, 'Murder Victims' Relative Seeks Wider State DNA Database', Los Angeles Times,
22 December 2003.
120 RAINN, 'Fighting Sexual Violence with DNA', available at <http://www.rainn.org/public-policy/
legislative-agendaffighting-sexual-violence-with-DNA>, accessed 5 August 2011.
121 J. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2nd edn (Longman: New York, 1995).
122 See above n. 26.
123 Johnson and Williams, above n. 18.
124 Arkansas Act 1974, s. 6.
125 See below n. 170.
126 House of Representatives, 18 May 2010, H3503-3504, per Tom Rooney.
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Seeking to counter the effect of such policy enterprise, various non-profit organi-
sations have opposed non-conviction DNA databases through campaigns and
policy documents1 27 and by participating as amicus curiae in relevant cases 12n
Haskell and Ento v Brown the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed a motion
for a preliminary injunction to prevent state collection and storage of the DNA of
arrestees,' although this was denied by the US District Court for the Northern
District of California. In Maryland a compromise was reached due to the
opposition of the Legislative Black Caucus of Maryland to Governor O'Malley's
initial proposal, due to the absence of a warrant before collection, the exacer-
bation of racial bias in the criminal justice system and concerns about
overwhelming crime labs with meaningless DNA samples. The Caucus sought
numerous safeguards such as a prohibition on sample collection before charging,
a prohibition on familial searching and that no samples be entered into any
database until after arraignment was granted,130 all of which were granted. By
limiting collection and retention to certain violent offences and burglary, by
imposing safeguards, and by emphasising that 'the purpose [of a DNA profile] is
akin to that of a fingerprint',131 the General Assembly in Maryland passed the Bill
which came into effect on 1 January 2009. Thus, the dynamic between executive
and political entrepreneurs and other engaged and vocal political actors led to a
moderated form of non-conviction databases.
In England and Wales, the non-conviction DNA database finally became an issue of
political debate in 2006132 with the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives
pledging to rein in its scope. After the ECtHR's decision in S and Marper castigated
the United Kingdom for its DNA collection and retention policies in England and
Wales, Labour introduced the Crime and Security Bill 2009 to provide a slightly
more restrictive model of non-conviction DNA retention. Although the Conserva-
127 Liberty, Response to 'Keeping the Right People on the DNA Database' (Liberty: London, 2009) 29; Liberty,
Response to the Human Genetic Comninission's Consultation on the National DNA Database (Liberty:
London, 2008). Advocacy groups like the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, the Privacy and Freedom
Center of the American Conservative Union and the Council for Responsible Genetics, the
American Civil Liberties Union, and Ronald Hampton of the National Black Police Association
opposed Proposition 69. See <http://www.aclunc.orgjnews/press releasestaclu lawsuit
challenges-california%27s mandatory dna-collection at arrest.shtml>, accessed 5 August
2011.
128 For example, the Electronic Privacy Information Centre in United States vKincade 379 F3d 813 (9th
Cir 2004) cert. denied, 544 US 924 (2005). Third-party submissions were received in S and Marper
from Liberty and Privacy International, see (2009) 48 EHRR 50 at paras 56-57.
129 Haskell and Ento v Brown 677 F Supp 2d 1187 (2009).
130 <http:/iaclu-md.orgaPress/AttachmentsLBCMComments.pdf>, accessed 5 August 2011.
131 State v Raines 857 A2d 19 at 33 (Md 2004).
132 M. Lynch, S. Cole and R. McNally, Truth Machine: The Contentious History of DNA Fingerprinting
(University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 2008) 51.
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tives voted against it at second reading, ultimately the Bill was not challenged,
despite the Tories' general opposition to non-conviction DNA databases. Indeed, it
was reported that Conservative support was guaranteed by the Labour Home
Secretary, Alan Johnson, threatening to withdraw all provisions to the Bill, thus
leaving the position as it was.133 Instead of blocking the Bill, the Shadow Home
Secretary at the time, Chris Grayling, pledged that if elected the Tories would not
permit retention of the DNA profiles of innocent people arrested for minor
offences,13 4 and this is manifested in the introduction of the Protection of
Freedoms Bill, which is currently being debated.13
The politics of risk
The aversion towards risk in US society, the influence of this on policy making and
the growing reliance on actuarial methods of crime explain the development of
non-conviction DNA databases and provide impetus for further expansion."' A key
concern of risk-oriented tactics is public protection which may potentially
supersede concern for individual rights.' In fact, due process rights run counter
to the notion of risk control13 1 which may overestimate the likelihood of a risk
occurring in a bid to protect the majority.
In England and Wales, risk was to the fore in justifying the existence of the
non-conviction DNA database. S and Marper prompted a lengthy consultation
process by the Home Office, ostensibly aimed 'to provide a proportionate balance
between protecting communities and protecting the rights of the individual' 139
133 Alan Travis and Polly Curtis, 'Conservatives drop opposition to DNA proposals following Alan
Johnson ultimatum', Guardian, 7 April 2010.
134 Ibid.
135 See text above accompanying n. 40.
136 This stems from the seminal work of theorists such as Mary Douglas and Ulrich Beck. See M.
Douglas and A. Wildavsky, Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technical and Environmental
Dangers (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1982), and U. Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New
Modernity (Sheffield Region Centre for Science and Technology: Sheffield, 1992).
137 For a consideration of further problematic aspects of actuarial techniques, see B. Harcourt,
Against Prediction: Profiling, Policing, and Punishing in an Actuarial Age (University of Chicago Press:
Chicago, 2006).
138 While the emphasis on risk in criminal justice policy and discourse may be interpreted as
subsuming traditional notions of individual fairness and equity, O'Malley cautions that the
concept of risk should not necessarily be regarded as negative: P. O'Malley, 'Risk Societies and
the Government of Crime' in M. Brown and J. Pratt (eds), Dangerous Offenders: Punishment and
Social Order (Routledge: London, 2000) 17. He notes that risk-based tactics and categories maybe
more incorporative than traditional approaches which involve coercion, exclusion and
correction: P. O'Malley, 'Risk, Power and Crime Prevention' (1992) 21 Economy and Society 252 at
254.
139 <http:/iwww.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/cons-2009-dna-databasej>, accessed 5 August 2011.
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although the lack of a rights-focus in the resulting paper"4 is noticeable. The
Home Office recommended the destruction of DNA samples after six months,
whether the individual is later convicted or not; permanent retention of DNA
profiles (as opposed to samples) after conviction; retention for 12 years after arrest
for a serious violent or sexual offence or terrorism-related offence and six years for
other offences. These periods were chosen based on the likelihood of offending by
people who have been arrested and not convicted, drawing on research included
in Annex C to the paper which purported to show that 52 per cent of reoffending
happens within six years, and two-thirds of reoffending happens within 12 years.
The Home Office stressed that changing the existing policy would 'reduce the
number of detections that DNA delivers, and will therefore have some adverse
impact on public protection' and thus it aimed 'to minimise this risk while
complying with the ECtHR ruling'. " This was an explicit acknowledgement that
the Home Office sought to maintain as lengthy a retention period as would be
permissible, and the definite emphasis in the consultation document was on risk
rather than rights' analysis: 'In determining the most suitable retention period,
the key question is one of risk'. Although the paper admitted that the evidence
for reoffending in more serious and violent cases was unclear, a longer retention
period was deemed to be 'a commonsense approach given the more serious conse-
quences of reoffending and therefore the damage that a missed detection would
imply'.1 43 In fact, it is unlikely that the ECtHR would have viewed the proposed
12-year retention period as proportionate, and the appeal to common sense in a
document which professes to be scientific is jarring.44 Moreover, the validity of
the methodology in the report is questionable,14 suggesting that merely the
lexicon of risk was cited, as a disguise for the more authoritarian and invasive
approach of the NDNAD.
Similarly, studies on so-called 'preventable crimes' have been relied upon in policy
development in the United States, indicating the growing centrality of risk
140 Home Office, Keeping the Right People on the Database: Science and Public Protection (Home Office:
London, 2009) para. 2.9.
141 Ibid. at para. 2.9.
142 Ibid. at para. 6.6.
143 Ibid. at para. 6.13.
144 See McCartney et al, above n. 117 at paras 6.7-6.10.
145 K. Soothill and B. Francis, Keeping Innocent People on the DNA Database (2009), available as Appendix 1
to The Information Comnissioner's Response to the Home Office Consultation Paper on the Retention, Use and
Destruction of DNA Data and Fingerprints, available at <http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/
library/data-protectionjnotices/response-to-ho-consultation mayO9.pdf>, accessed 5 August
2011.
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF EVIDENCE & PROOF 303
NON-CONVICTION DNA DATABASES IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND
there.146 Two empirical studies carried out in Chicago and Maryland indicate a
significant number of violent crimes which could have been prevented had DNA
been sampled upon arrest rather than conviction,147 and these have been cited on
numerous occasions at the federal and state level. 4 8 Such reference to science in
criminal justice appeals to politicians who prefer the expertise of technical scien-
tists who are seen as objective and non-ideological, in contrast to the 'softer' and
by implication ideologically driven expertise of human rights lawyers, criminolo-
gists, psychologists and political scientists, who are increasingly neglected in the
policy-making process. Indeed, one could also consider the issue not solely as one
of 'hard' versus 'soft' social science, but also centring around the independence of
the research: while plenty of criminologists could have carried out 'hard' quanti-
tative studies of this issue, existing studies have been performed in-house on
behalf of state and government bodies. The use of science in the criminal process
in this manner is ostensibly 'universal, general, uniform, and neutral'149 and fits
with the distrust of certain professionals, criminologists, officials and practi-
tioners identified by Rock in the Home Office in the mid-1990s"'5 and the pervasive
fall of 'liberal elitism' in the governance of crime."' Thus, while collection and
retention of DNA encroaches on civil liberties, policy makers couch the debate in
terms of empirical validity and scientific methodology, supported by in-house
research, to ensure their palatability.
In a related concept, Feeley and Simon observed almost two decades ago that
a new penology, with revised discourses, objectives and techniques, was
146 For example, see the Minutes of the Meeting of the Assembly Committee of Nevada on the
Judiciary, Seventy-Fifth Session, 13 March 2009; Maryland Politics Watch, 'O'Malley Comments
on DNA Collection', 26 March 2009, available at <http://maryland-politics.blogspot.com/2009/
03/omalley-comments-on-dna-collection.html>, accessed 5 August 2011; 'House Judiciary
Committee Adopts Schiff Amendments to Improve DNA Tools for Law Enforcement and
Investigators and Eliminate DNA Backlogs', 11 June 2008, available at <http://schiff.house.gov/
index.cfin?sectionid=124&parentid=25&sectiontree=6,25,124&itemid=276>, accessed 5 August
2011.
147 See <http://sccvc.org/sccvc/news/ChicagosStudy-onPreventableCrimesO3-04-2008.pdf>;
<http://www.denverda.org/DNADocuments/MarylandDNlarresteestudy.pdf>, accessed 5
August 2011.
148 See Congressional Records (Senate), 29July 2005, S9528 etseq. and Congressional Records (Senate),
16 December 2005, S13756, per Mr Kyl; Congressional Records (Senate), 14 July 2008, H6438 and
Congressional Records (Senate), 10 December 2009, S12904-S12907, per Mr Schiff.
149 R. Ericson and C. Shearing, 'The Scientification of Police Work' in G. Bohme and N. Stehr (eds), The
Knowledge Society (Kluwer Publishing: Dordrecht, 1986) 133.
150 P. Rock, 'The Opening Stages of Criminal Justice Policy Making' (1995) 35(1) British Journal of
Criminology 1 at 2.
151 See I. Loader, 'Fall of the "Platonic Guardians": Liberalism, Criminology and Political Responses
to Crime in England and Wales' (2006) 46 British Journal of Criminology 561 at 562 et seq.
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emerging,15 2 with a shift in discourse from retribution to the language of proba-
bility, and in which offenders are regarded as aggregates rather than individuals.
The focus is less on the responsibility, culpability and treatment of individuals,
but rather on techniques to identify, categorise and manage groups according to
their dangerousness: '[t]he task is managerial, not transformative'.'" As has also
been argued in relation to CCTV,'54 non-conviction DNA collection and retention
incorporates aspects of the new penology with its 'adaptive' strategies and
emphasis on crime prevention."' Indeed, DNA retention is paradigmatic of the
new penology, given that it subsumes individual characteristics by a standard
which applies to suspected offenders as a class yet does not seek to alter them or
the social situation. Moreover, the new penology also focuses on the notion of a
career criminal, where the primary concern is the identification of such high-risk
offenders to incapacitate and manage them."' As Johnson and Williams
emphasise, the notion of the recidivist offender is key to DNA collection and
retention," and this was demonstrated by the Home Office report which seems to
regard all arrestees and suspects as likely to 'reoffend' despite the absence of an
initial finding of guilt."' This underlines the assumption that the individual
whose genetic material has been taken at arrest is guilty of the suspected offence,
and again contributed to political acceptance of DNA retention.
Practical support for DNA databases
In addition to, or perhaps instead of, these ideologically and politically grounded
arguments are some more practical or banal explanations for non-conviction DNA
database expansion, namely the development of DNA technology and the avail-
ability of funding. Eschewing the significance of legal or principled factors, we
may look to the fact that much of the relevant technology and methodology used
in DNA sample comparison and profiling originated in the United Kingdom. DNA
profiling was developed by Professor Alec Jeffreys at the University of Leicester,
152 M. Feeley and J. Simon, 'The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and its
Implications' (1992) 30 Criiniriology 449.
153 Ibid. at 449-52.
154 C. Norris and M. McCahill, 'CCTV: Beyond Penal Modernism?' (2006) 46 British Journal of Criminology
97.
155 The concept of risk in relation to DNA databases has been more thoroughly explored in C.
McCartney, Forensic Identification and Crininal Justice: Forensic Science, Justice and Risk (Willan:
Cullompton, 2006) xiv; R. Johnson and R. Williams, 'Circuits of Surveillance' (2004) 2(1)
Surveillance & Society 1 at 11; C. McCartney, 'Forensic DNA Sampling and the England and Wales
National DNA Database: A Sceptical Approach' (2004) 12(2) Critical Criminology 157 at 165.
156 M. Feeley and J. Simon, 'Actuarial Justice: the Emerging Criminal Law' in D. Nelken (ed.), The
Futures of Criniinology (London: Sage, 1994) 164-5.
157 Johnson and Williams, above n. 155 at 10.
158 Home Office, above n. 140 at para. 2.8.
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England, from the mid-1980s onwards,' and the UK's Forensic Science Service
pioneered the development and implementation of DNA technologies which facil-
itated the creation of the world's first DNA database in 1995. Thus, England and
Wales had both the available technology and the impetus to stay at the cutting
edge by using such tactics. As McCartney et al. note, the content of the criminal law
may be influenced by practical considerations such as technological develop-
ments occurring simultaneously with the emergence of a competitive forensic
marketplace and the absence of a backlog of genetic material to process (in
contrast to the USsoyi 6 1 Indeed, in S and Marper v United Kingdom, the government
emphasised that the United Kingdom 'is in the vanguard of the development of
the use of DNA samples in the detection of crime',162 thereby explaining and justi-
fying the size and resources of its DNA database. However, the court considered
that any state claiming a 'pioneer role' bears special responsibility for striking the
right balance between crime control and privacy,'16 rather than acquiring a carte
blanche to extend this investigative method.
Furthermore, the development of law relating to DNA collection and retention in
England was matched by specific increased funding via the DNA Expansion
Programme, as well as training for police officers and scientific personnel. 164 This
was critical to ensure implementation of the law, and, when combined with the
ideological and political factors previously outlined, conspired to permit dramatic
growth of the non-conviction DNA database. Although the funding made available
for the project is certainly a function of the existing political support, the current
economically straitened times may begin to impact upon the UK DNA database.
The Forensic Science Service (FSS), which has the contract to provide operational
services for the NDNAD, and which receives and loads profiles to the NDNAD and
searches it for matches, W is to close in 2012.166 Given the range of 'austerity'
measures being introduced in light of the economic recession, the rapidly
159 See above n. 13.
160 See National Institute of Justice, 'DNA Evidence Backlogs: Forensic Casework', available at
<http:!/www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nijitopicsiforensics/lab-operationsfevidence-backlogsjforiensic-evidence-
bacldog.htm>, accessed 5 August 2011; Dr Christian Hassell, Assistant Director, Laboratory
Division Federal Bureau of Investigation Statement before the House Committee on the
Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security (Washington DC, 20 May
2010).
161 McCartney et al., above n. 117 at para. 1.9.
162 S and Marper v United Kingdom (2009) 48 EHRR 50 at para. 111.
163 Ibid. at para. 112.
164 Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, above n. 10 at 2.
165 Forensic Science Service at <http://www.forensic.gov.uk/htmlcompany/>, accessed 5 August
2011.
166 BBC News, 'Forensic Science Service to be wound up', available at <http: /!ww.bbc.co.uk/news
uk-11989225>, accessed 5 August 2011.
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increasing expenditure on the NDNAD and the previous failure to assess the
benefits and costs of thisl67 may soon be revisited.
Support for database expansion in the United States is evident in the increased
funding for DNA collection and retention, with the Backlog Reduction Funding
Awardsl6 8 and the Convicted Offender and Arrestee DNA Backlog Reduction
Program. 69 The DNA Expansion and Improvement Act of 2009 introduced a
scheme of 'DNA Technology Enhancement Grants' which allows the Attorney-
General to issue grants to states and local government totalling $50 million per
year from 2009-13 to buy or improve forensic DNA technology.170 Moreover, the
federal Katie Sepich Enhanced DNA Collection Act of 2010 provides for incentive
payments for states to implement enhanced DNA collection processes, that is,
from persons arrested for serious offences like homicide, sexual offences, aggra-
vated assault and burglary. If state compliance is ensured owing to such bonuses, a
considerable expansion of the CODIS database will result.
The determining power of the law
Contemporary criminal justice and penal policy often demonstrates contra-
dictory rationales and aims, with the co-existence of opposing ideas like
incapacitation and correctional reform, and stigmatisation and reintegration.
This has been explained by reference to states' adaptation to and denial of high
crime rates and the inability to resolve the issue, ' and the conflicting principles
of the 'law and order' politics of the New Right which wields considerable power
over policy development.172 In the same manner, while historical resistance to
non-conviction DNA databases in the United States may be explained by
ideological, political and practical factors, policies allowing for such DNA
sampling and retention are likely to proliferate given the aversion towards risk
in crime control practices, and the ready enterprise of political and other actors,
bolstered by an injection of funds.
167 McCartney et at, above n. 117 at para. 1.4.
168 See Backlog Reduction Funding Awards 2004-10, available at <http://Www.ojp.usdoj.gov]
nij/itopics/forensics/lab-operations/capacity/backlog-reduction-funding.htm>, accessed 5 August
2011.
169 DNA Initiative, 'Convicted Offender and Arrestee DNA Backlog Reduction Program', available at
<http://www.dna.govlfunding/convictedj>, accessed 5 August 2011.
170 DNA Expansion and Improvement Act of 2009, s. 2.
171 Garland, above n. 93 at 110 et seq.
172 P. O'Malley, 'Volatile and Contradictory Punishment' (1999) 3 Theoretical Cripinology 175 at 176 et
seq.
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This article has outlined how numerous factors encouraged the early adoption in
England of this crime control technology when compared with the United States;
what is now posited is that ultimately, it is the interpretation and implementation
of constitutional law and human rights that governs and will determine the scope
of the schemes in both countries. As noted, the law in England and Wales in this
area was found by the ECtHR to breach the right to privacy as safeguarded by
Article 8 of the ECHR.'" By signing and ratifying the ECHR, the United Kingdom
vouched to guarantee to everyone within its jurisdiction the rights and freedoms
defined in the Convention, and granted the ECtHR binding authority to decide
cases on such matters. Where the law of a state which is party to an ECtHR case is
found to be incompatible with the Convention, national law must be amended to
cohere with the decision,174 as is currently occurring by means of the Protection of
Freedoms Bill. This change of the law to accord with the European judgment
demonstrates the ultimate superiority of the law.
In the United States approval in state courts of DNA collection and retention has
allowed the establishment of and safeguarded the legitimacy of non-conviction
databases. While the US Supreme Court has not yet accepted a case concerning the
constitutionality of the collection and retention of DNA from innocent persons,
state courts have examined this issue. Despite the more entrenched conceptions of
privacy as elucidated above, most courts have approved of this measure. In the
American constitutional sense, the compulsory extraction of blood for DNA
profiling has been viewed as constituting a 'search' as it falls within the person's
'reasonable expectation of privacy',"' thus bringing the procedure within the
scope of the Fourth Amendment.I" Constitutional jurisprudence has refined the
parameters of the Fourth Amendment to provide that although a search or seizure
must usually be conducted with a warrant and with probable cause, it may still be
reasonable if obtaining a warrant was impractical, if individualised suspicion
exists, or where a 'special need' that goes beyond normal law enforcement
purposes was present.17 The court may also invoke a general balancing approach,
the 'totality of circumstances' test, which sets the state interest against that of the
individual to determine the reasonableness of the search 'by assessing, on the one
hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the
173 As previously noted, Scotland has different laws and rules regarding DNA collection and
retention.
174 Article 53.
175 Katz v United States 389 US 347 (1967).
176 United States v Kincade 379 F3d 813 (9th Cir 2004) (en banc).
177 Schmerber v California 384 US 757 (1966); Terry v Ohio 392 US 1 (1968); Newjersey v T1 469 US 325
(1985).A special need has been found not to exist where the primary aim was to detect evidence of
ordinary criminal wrongdoing: City of Indianapolis v Edmond 531 US 32 at 44 (2000).
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other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate govern-
mental interests'."' Every court which has analysed the federal or equivalent state
statutes permitting collection and analysis of DNA from convicted persons has
upheld them as compliant with the Fourth Amendment,"' but there is less consis-
tency regarding the position of unconvicted individuals in state courts. For the
most part, the general balancing test has been applied to uphold the collection of
DNA samples from persons arrested for violent felonies on the basis that it entails
a minimal privacy intrusion, and because of the diminished expectation of privacy
of arrestees when compared with the general population and the compelling
interest in DNA as a law enforcement tool."' However, in Friedman v Boucher and
Luzaich the Ninth Circuit found that the sampling of an arrestee was in breach of
the Fourth Amendment."' Neither the special needs test nor the general balancing
test validated DNA collection: the former did not apply since the only government
interest in taking DNA was 'to help solve "cold cases" ... clearly a normal law
enforcement function', and the search was not reasonable on a balancing
approach as the only limitation permitted on pre-trial detainees' right to be free
from suspicionless searches was for prison security.182
The preceding analysis has indicated that in essence, the development of
non-conviction DNA databases is contingent on many legal and political factors,
and indeed in England and Wales the combination of political and cultural
variables without a robust constitutional framework of protection for individual
privacy provided a heady enticement to New Labour to expand the NDNAD.
Historical contingencies and constitutional jurisprudence has provided a brake in
this regard in the American setting, yet it appears that non-conviction databases
will become more common in the United States. While the absence of a distinct
right to privacy and the presence of a certain form of communitarian politics may
once have eased the expansion of DNA collection and retention in England and
17S Samson v California 547 US 843 at 848 (2006).
179 Jones v Murray 962 F2d 302 (4th Cir 1992); United States v Kimrler 335 F3d 1132 (10th Cir 2003);
Groceman v US Department of Justice 354 F3d 411 (5th Cir 2004); Green v Berge 354 F3d 675 (7th Cir
2004); United States vKincade 379 F3d 813 (9th Cir 2004) cert. denied, 544 US 924 (2005); Nicholas v
Goord 430 F3d 652 (2d Cir 2005); United States v Sczubelek 402 F3d 175 (3rd Cir 2005); PadgettvDonald
401 F3d 1273 (11th Cir 2005) cert. denied, 546 US 820 (2005); Wilson v Collins 517 F3d 421 (6th Cir
2006); United States v Conley 453 F3d 674 (6th Cir 2006); United States v Hook 471 F3d 766 (7th Cir
2006); United States v Kraklio 451 F3d 922 (8th Cir 2006); United States v Weikert 504 F3d 1 (1st Cir
2007); United States v Amerson 483 F3d 73 (2d Cir 2007); United States v Kriesel 508 F3d 941 (9th Cir
2007); United States v Banks 490 F3d 1178 (10th Cir 2007).
180 Anderson v Virginia 650 SE2d 702 at 706 (Vir 2006); United States v Pool 645 F Supp 2d 903 at 912
(2009); Haskell and Ento v Brown 677 F Supp 2d 1187 (2009).
181 Friedman v Boucher and Luzaich 580 F3d 847 (2009).
182 A similar conclusion was reached in United States v Mitchell 681 F Supp 2d 597 (2009).
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Wales, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR is now limiting this scheme. In contrast, in
the United States the legal norm of privacy and a classical liberal ideology may
once have dissuaded policy makers from introducing such measures; nevertheless
judicial interpretation of the Constitution now permits the growth of
non-conviction databases.
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